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[Crim. No. 5683. In Bank. Feb. 28, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ELJOE MADDOX,
Appellant.
[lJ Criminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-The rule that
admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in
the absence of proper objection in the trial court is not applicable to appeals based on admission of illegally obtained evidence in cases tried before the decision in People v. Oahan,
44 Ca1.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905.
[2J Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that officers acted legally
in entering premises to make an arrest and in seizing evidence
incident thereto.
[8] Arrest - Without Warrant -Reasonable Cause.-Where an
officer had defendant's home under surveillance for about a
month and had observed known narcotics users frequenting it,
and information was given by one user to the officer that he
had been to defendant's home and had taken a shot of heroin,
there was reasonable cause for defendant's arrest.
[4J Criminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful
Seizure.-Evidence which was illegally seized is excluded on
the ground that the government must not be allowed to profit
by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the lawless enforcement of the law.
[6] Id.-Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.illegal conduct that was entirely unrelated and collateral to
securing evidence objected to does not render that evidence
inadmissible.
[8] Searches and Seizures -Reasonableness.-The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantees relating to searches and
seizures is to prevent unreasonable invasions of the security
of the people in their persons, houses, papers and effects, and
when an officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to
make an arrest and as an incident to that arrest is authorized
to make a reasonable search, his entry and his search are Dot
unreasonable.
[2J See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, 12 et seq.; Am..Jur••
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d. Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 48 et seq.
[4J See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Criminal Law, § 1080; [2,6] Searches
and Seizures, §I; [3J Arrest, 112; [4,5,11] Criminal Law, 1410;
[7-10J Arrest, 113.
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[7] Arrest-Making Arrest.-Suspects have no constitutional right
to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic constitutional
guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting
to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he
would had he complied with Pen. Code, § 844, relating to demanding admittance before breaking open the door of the
house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which the
officer has reasonable grounds for believing him to be.
[8] ld.-Making Arrest.-Since the demand and explanation requirements of Pen. Code, § 844, as prerequisite to breaking a
door or window in making an arrest, are a codification of t1te
common law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limite<1
by the common-law rules that compliance is not required if
the officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest
frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose.
[9] ld.-Making Arrest.-When an officer has reasonable grounds
to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating
footsteps in a house, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose is not unreasonable.
[10] ld. - Making Arrest. - Where an officer's right to invade
defendant's privacy clearly appears, there is no compelling
need for strict compliance with the demand and explanation
requirements of Pen. Code, § 844, to protect basic constitutional guarantees.
[11] Criminal Law-Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful
Seizure.-When there is reasonable cause to make an arrest
and search and the facts known to an officer before his entry
in a house are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on his
part that compliance with the demand and explanation requirements of Pen. Code, § 844, is excused, his failure to
comply with such requirements does not justify the exclusion
of evidence he obtains.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial. James
R. Agee, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for selling heroin and for maintaining a place
for the purpose of selling, giving away, or using heroin.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Eljoe Maddox, in pro. per., and Clinton Wayne White,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Leo. J. Vander Lans, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was found guilty by a jury
of two counts of selling heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500)
and one count of maintaining a place for the purpose of
selling, giving away, or using heroin. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11557.) His motion for a new trial was denied, and judgment was pronounced against him. He appeals from the judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Roy Cleek testified that on June 23, 1954, he visited defendant's home in Oakland and bought a $10 "paper" of
heroin, as he had done many times in the preceding six
months. He used defendant's equipment to take a shot of
heroin and left it on the kitchen table. Both Cleek and Joe
Davis testified that at about 3 :30 p. m., Davis. came to defendant's residence, bought a "paper" from defendant, and
used the same equipment to take a shot of heroin. Shortly
after 4 :30 p. m. Cleek and Davis left the premises and had
not gone far when they were arrested by Officers Taylor
and Hilliard of the Oakland Police Department. Officer
Taylor testified that he had the premises under surveillance
for about a month, that he saw known users of narcotics
frequenting them, and that on. June 23d he and Officer Hilliard arrived at their lookout a few minutes before Cleek and
Davis left defendant's home. Davis told the officers that he
had been to defendant's home and had taken a shot of heroin.
Officer Taylor and Davis then went to defendant's door and
knocked. Officer Taylor heard a male voice say, "Wait a'
minute" and also heard the sound of retreating footsteps.
He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where
he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand .running
toward the bedroom. He grappled with defendant, who threw
the spoon into the bedroom. He found a small parcel containing two hypodermic needles, a syringe, and an eye dropper
on the kitchen table. There were traces of heroin on the
. spoon. Within two hours after the officers arrived, seven
persons came to the premises, five were known to Officer
Taylor as narcotics users, and a sixth had· needle marks on
his arm.
Defendant testified in his own behalf and denied that he
had sold heroin to Cleek or Davis or had ever had heroin in
his possession. Cleek was a friend of his who visited him
that day for a friendly conversation, and Davis came to discuss a new fender for defendant's car. After Cleek and
Davis left, defendant discovered the parcel on the kitchen
table and concluded that one of his visitors had left it. He
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denied any knowledge of the spoon or having it in his hand
when Officer Taylor entered.
Defendant contends that the spoon and hypodermic equipment were illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. The
attorney general contends that the officers had reasonable
cause to arrest defendant for the commission of a felony,
that they could lawfully enter his premises to make the arrest,
and that the seizure of the evidence was lawful as an incident to the arrest. He also contends that since no objection
was made in the trial court, the admissibility of the evidence
cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal.
[1] This case was tried before the decision in People v.
Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. We held in People v.
Kitchens, ante, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17], that the rule that the
admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in
the absence of a proper objection in the trial court, is not
applicable to appeals based on the admission of illegally
obtained evidence in cases tried before the decision in the
Cahan case. [2] In such cases, however, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the officers acted
legally. (People v. FaN'ara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21].)
[3] Moreover, in the present case Officer Taylor had defendant's home under surveillance for about a month and had
observed known narcotics users frequenting it, and the information Davis gave him before the arrest was reasonable
cause for the arrest. (See People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d 652,
656 [290 P.2d 535] ; Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 8.)
Defendant contends, however, that the arrest was illegal
because Officer Taylor did not comply with Penal Code, section 844. That section provides: "To make an arrest, a
private person, if the offense be a felony, and in all cases
a peace-officer, may break open the door or window of the
house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they
have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having
demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which
admittance is desired." It is undisputed that Officer Taylor
did not demand admittance and explain the purpose of the
demand before he kicked in defendant's door.
The question is thus presented whether or not evidence
obtained by a search incident to an arrest must be excluded
when the officer has reasonable cause to make the arrest and
search but fails to comply with the requirements of section
844. In previous cases we considered the requirements of
both section 844 and section 841 of the Penal Code, but found
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it unnecessary to determine whether a violation of either
section without more compels exclusion of evidence obtained
at the time of an arrest, since those sections were complied
with (see e.g., People v. Martin, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 762-763
[290 P.2d 855J ; People v. Rios, ante, p. 297 [294 P.2d 39] ;
Willson v. Superior Oourt, ante, p. 291 [294 P.2d 36]), or
the evidence was otherwise unlawfully obtained. (See People
v. Oahan, supra, 44 Ca1.2d 434.)
The answer to this question must be sought in the basic
reasons for the exclusionary rule. We considered those reasons again in People v. Martin, ''II/pra, 45 Ca1.2d 755, and
expressly rejected the theory that evidence is excluded to
redress or punish a past wrong. [4] The evidence is excluded
"on the ground that the government must not be allowed
to profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the
lawless enforcement of the law." (45 Ca1.2d at p. 761.)
[5] Accordingly, we held in the Martin case and in People
v. Boyles, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 652, 654, that illegal conduct
that was entirely unrelated and collateral to the securing of
the evidence objected to does not render that evidence inadmissible. (See also Rogers v. Superior Oourt, ante, pp.
3, 10-11 [291 P.2d 929].) An example of such conduct
would be the failure to comply with the requirements of Penal
Code, section 841,· which are analogous to the requirements
of section 844. If the officer has reasonable cause to make an
arrest, a violation of section 841 would be unrelated and
collateral to the securing of evidence by a search incident to
the arrest, for what the search turns up will in no way depend
on whether the officer informed "the person to be arrested
of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest,
and the authority to make it."
The demand and explanation requirements of section 844
present a more difficult problem. The officer's compliance
with them will delay his entry, and eases might arise in
which the delay would permit .destruction or secretion of
evidence so that what the search turns up would depend on
the officer's compliance with the section. In other cases,
however, the evidence may not be readily disposed of, and in
·"The person making tlle urrest must inform the person to be arrested
of the intention to arrest him, of tlle CIluse of tlIe arrest, and the
authority to make it, except when the person to be arrestt'd is actually
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, or ill
pursued immediately after its l'ommission, or after an escape."

)

306

)

PEOPLE fl. MADDOX

[46 C.2d

still others it may be impossible to determine whether or
not the evidence would still have been available had there
been the delay incident to complying with the section.
[6] It must be borne in mind that the primary purpose
of the constitutional guarantees is to prevent unreasonable
invasions of the security of the people in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, and when an officer has reasonable cause
to enter a dwelling to make an arrest and as an incident to
that arrest is authorized to make a reasonable search, his
entry and his search are not unreasonable. [7] Suspects have
no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence,
and no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because
an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is entitled
to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with
section 844. [8] Moreover, since the demand and explanation
requirements of section 844 are a codmcation of the common
law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limited by the
common law rules that compliance is not required if the
officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose.
(Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 [10 Am.Dec. 110]; see
Rest., Torts, § 206, com. d.) Without the benefit of hind.
sight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the
officer must decide these questions in the first instance.
[9] When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that
the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable. In this proceeding
we are not concerned with whether or not the officer's failure
to do so would have justified defendant in using force to
protect his person or property, or whether or not a jury in
a trespass action might conclude that reasonable cause for
the officer's failure to comply with the demand and explana·
tion requirements did not exist. [10] Moreover, since the
officer's right to invade defendant's privacy clearly appears,
there is no compelling need for strict compliance with the
requirements of section 844 to protect basic constitutional
guarantees. (Cf. People v. Boyles, 81tpra, 45 Ca1.2d 652.
656; People v. Cahan, 81tpra, 44 Ca1.2d 434, 442, footnote.)
[11] We conclude therefore that when there is reasonable
cause to make an arrest and search and the facts known to
him before his entry are not inconsistent with a· good faith
belief on the part of the officer that compliance with section
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844 is excused, his failure to comply with the formal requirements of that section does not justify the exclusion of
the evidence he obtains.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance because I believe that on the record before us the officers had
reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was engaged
in the commission of a felony at the time the search was
executed and that the evidence obtained as the result of
the search was therefore admissible against him.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 21,
1956.
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